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Quantifying risk of ground impact fatalities of power line inspection
BVLOS flight with small unmanned aircraft
Anders la Cour-Harbo1
Abstract— One of the major challenges of conducting op-
eration of unmanned aircraft, especially operations beyond
visual line-of-sight (BVLOS), is to make a realistic and effective
risk assessment. An important part of such an assessment
is to identify the risk of fatalities, preferably in a quan-
titative way since this allows for comparison with manned
aviation to determine whether an equivalent level of safety
is achievable. This works presents a method for quantifying
the probability of fatalities resulting from an uncontrolled
descent of an unmanned aircraft conducting a BVLOS flight.
The method is based on a standard stochastic model, and
employs parameterized high fidelity ground impact distribution
models that accounts for both aircraft specifications, parameter
uncertainties, and wind. The method also samples the flight
path to create an almost continuous quantification of the risk
as a function of mission flight time. The probability of fatality
is determined for a Talon model aircraft on a power line
inspection mission.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
As part of the regulatory process in Denmark the Danish
Transport, Construction and Housing Authority decided in
early 2016 to initiate a project called BVLOS FastTrack to
investigate what requirements and circumstances would be
appropriate in order to grant (initially) a few companies per-
mission to routinely conduct BVLOS operations in Danish
airspace. At that time no permissions had been granted for
BVLOS flight in Denmark expect for flights in Greenland
and individual flights confined to specific routes and dates.
The purpose of the project was to grant permissions based on
a thorough and scientific analysis of the risks involved for a
type of flight rather than just one specific flight. Danish UAS
operator companies were invited to participate in the project,
and their contribution would be supplying all information
required for a thorough analysis as well as conducting a
number of test flights to demonstrate the ability to adhere to
proper procedures. In turn they would be, should the risk of
their proposed BVLOS flight be acceptable, granted permis-
sion to conduct BVLOS operations within given limitations.
The incitement would be that these limitation would not be
specifically geographical and temporal, meaning that a flight
permission would state that any flight within the given limits
would be permitted independent of geographical location and
point in time.
A few companies participated in the project with rather
different applications for the flights. This work focuses on
Heliscope, a Danish UAS inspection company that uses
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unmanned aircraft for powerline inspections, and presents
how we developed risk profile for their particular type of
flight. The aim of this work as well as the BVLOS FastTrack
project is to develop a method that allows for immediate
quantification of the risk for people on the ground when a
given unmanned aircraft flies overhead.
B. Previous work
There are numerous works on how to conceptually ap-
proach the challenge of determining the risk of an unmanned
aircraft flight. Much is borrowed from the world of manned
aviation that has been conducting risk management for
decades. A number of examples of risk assessments and
quantifications for unmanned aircraft are the following. [1]
addresses the lack of an accepted framework and provides
some guidelines for how to apply existing models to manage
the risk. In [2] a comprehensive description of how to man-
age the risk of unmanned aircraft operations, including ’the
systematic application of management policies, procedures
and practices to the activities of communicating, consulting,
establishing the context, and assessing, evaluating, treating,
monitoring and reviewing risk.’ This work also presents a
series of quantification of existing risks for various types
of aviation. Metrics for safety, including hazard metrics and
risks metrics are presented in [3], in [4] a software safety case
is developed, and in [5] a generic safety case is presented
based on experience with NASA unmanned aircraft missions.
The uncontrolled descent of unmanned aircraft into popu-
lated areas have been the subject in a number of publications.
This includes [6] that investigate larger aircraft through an
equivalent level of safety analysis. [7] specifically looks at
distribution of possible impact locations based on simulation,
and [8] uses the standard statistical setup (which is also used
in this work) and applies a normal distribution approach
using aircraft glide parameters to model the impact location.
The barrier bow tie model also used in manned aviation risk
assessment is presented in [9].
C. Current work
The aim in this work is to go beyond a qualitative approach
that provides framework for risk assessment, and instead
use a quantitative approach to determine as accurately as
possible, the level of safety for a given flight operation, using
a metric similar to what is used in manned aviation, i.e.
fatalities per flight hour. The modelling of the probability
of fatalities is done with a stochastic approach similar to
many of the previous works listed above. However, the
determination of the individual probabilities in the model is
done using georeferenced probability density functions at a
high fidelity and (almost) continuously along the flight path
to provide not just a single probability for the entire flight,
but indeed a fatality rate for the flight path itself. The details
of the stochastic modelling of impact areas for uncontrolled
descents is beyond the scope of this work, and is provided
in separate publications by this author, see [10] and [11].
II. METHODS
The basic approach is similar to previous work in using
a stochastic model that joins probabilities in the causal
chain from drone malfunction to a potential fatality. The
specific design of this stochastic model varies from work
to work; here, in Section II-A, we use a fairly simple setup,
where the focus is on the probabilities related to the aircraft
ground/person impact. The model is used for three different
types of flight terminating events, see Section II-B, each with
their own high resolution ground impact probability density
function, see Section II-C, including the effect of wind, see
Section II-D and associated event probability, see Section II-
E. Rather than a priori assuming an average population
density for the entire flight (as seen in most previous work),
we employ a high resolution population density map, see
Section II-F. Finally, a map from person impact to probability
of fatality is used, based on work in the field of forensic
science, see Section II-G.
We then use the stochastic model on a (sufficiently
densely) sampled flight path to determine the probabilities
of fatality as a function of the flight path, and subsequently
determine the total flight risk by summing over the flight
path. This is done separately for the different types of flight
terminating events to accommodate the varying lethality
parameters associated with the manner in which the aircraft
descents in each of the event scenarios. The is described in
more detail along with the results in Section III.
A. Probability of fatality
For computing the probability of fatality we will use this
standard formulation similar to what is employed in several
of the previous works listed in Section I-B.
pfatality = pevent · pimpact person · pfatal impact , (1)
where pevent is the probability per hour of a given event (of
which we will use three), pimpact person is the conditional
probability that given an occurrence of one of the events that
a person will be impacted, and pfatal impact is the conditional
probability, given a person is impact as a result of one of the
event, that this person suffers a fatal injury.
We will include three events; ballistic decent, uncontrolled
glide, and fly-away (see II-B). We will attach a given
probability to each of these based primarily on the work
of others (see section II-E).
The probability of impacting a person is computed by
establishing a georeferenced probability density function for
each type of event associated with the geographical location
where the event happens, correlating this with a population
density map of sufficient resolution, and modifying the result
to account for various factors pertaining to each event type.
The result is a probability of impacting a person should each
of the events happen at the specified geographical location,
and will thus be dependent on the actual flight path of the
aircraft.
B. Crash events
For this particular mission flown by the Heliscope Talon
aircraft we use three different events that can occur during
flight and will force a descent of the aircraft in a manner that
does not allow for reaching either home or any designated
safe impact zone. These are
1) Ballistic descent This is a situation where the aircraft
looses most of its lift, for instance by a wing breaking
off or loosing a motor (physically separating from
the aircraft). The aircraft will then enter a (close to)
ballistic descent governed mainly by the drag of the
crippled aircraft and the wind.
2) Uncontrolled glide This is total loss of power on
a fixed wing aircraft, meaning loss of thrust and
control authority. The airframe is intact. The aircraft
is assumed to enter a glide path governed by the glide
ratio and the wind. The deflection surface are assumed
to be in a close to neutral position that may lead to a
slightly ’curved’ glide.
3) Fly-away This is loss of control authority of the
aircraft, while it continuous to operate as a powered
aircraft. The motion of the aircraft is controlled by the
autopilot, and it may fly to its maximum range in any
direction, including vertically up.
It is quite easy to envision and include additional failure
scenarios such as a spin due to a stuck actuator, loss of a
vital sensor that leaves the aircraft without useful navigation,
a vertical descent of a quad rotor due to loss of thrush on
one arm, and so on.
It is assumed that the failure event happens at some point
during the flight and that the resulting impact point on the
ground is relative to this point of failure. The ground impact
point is modelled with the uncertainties that reasonably may
affect the descent, for instance that the drag coefficient of a
aircraft without the wing is not known precisely. Addition-
ally, the ballistic and uncontrolled glide events also include
the effect of wind (with appropriate stochastic assumptions
on speed and direction). The details of modelling the ballistic
descent is present in [10] and the details of the uncontrolled
glide and fly-away are present in [11].
C. Modelling of ground impact probability density function
The ballistic descent is modelled with a second order
dependance on speed and under influence of gravity g. The
flight speed is v and initial (prior to event) flight velocity
is orthogonal to gravity. For a no-wind scenario this gives a
travelled distance in flight velocity direction of
x(y) ≈ m
c
ln
(
1 +
v
√
c(m ln 2 + cy)
m
√
mg
)
, cy > m (2)
for a given altitude y, where m is the aircraft mass, and c =
1
2ρACD with ρ is the air density, A is the frontal area creating
drag, and CD the drag coefficient. The approximation is quite
good for cy > m, which is the case for the Talon aircraft
at operational altitude. The drag coefficient and the flight
speed are both stochastic variables assumed to be normally
distributed. The probability density function for x then gives
the probability of reaching a given distance during a ballistic
descent.
The uncontrolled glide assumes the aircraft is descending
as a glider, that is unpropelled and in an aerodynamic
equilibrium configuration with actuators in neutral or close
to neutral positions (no banking with ailerons and no turning
with the rudder). The glide ratio γ, the horizontally travelled
distance per vertically descended distance, is given as a
stochastic variable with mean equal to the estimated glide
ratio and a variance to accommodate for variations in elevator
deflection angle and variation in drag due to possible modifi-
cations of the aircraft to accommodate missions sensors. The
distance travelled in an uncontrolled glide is thus x(y) = γy.
A fly-away is assumed to be able to take the aircraft as
far as the maximum range (subject to the amount of ’fuel’
left), and all compass directions are equally probable. The
probability of ground impact is assumed to decreases linearly
with distance to the event point, reaching zero at maximum
range. Thus, the probability density function becomes a right
circular cone with apex at the event point and base coinciding
with the ground surface.
D. Wind
The influence of wind is significant for the unpropelled
events, ballistic descent and uncontrolled glide, as it will
cause the aircraft to be transported a given distance in the
wind direction. The actual distances travelled is assumed to
be equal to the wind velocity times the time it takes the
aircraft to descent from flight altitude to the ground. For the
ballistic descent this time is given as
t(y) ≈ m ln 2 + cy√
cmg
(3)
under the same conditions as (2), and for the uncontrolled
glide it will be t(y) = γy/vglide, where vglide is the hori-
zontal glide speed, assumed to be not too different from the
flight speed. The wind direction is assumed to be uniformly
distributed in all directions, and the wind velocity is assumed
to be normally distributed with a given mean and variance.
The effect of this is that the PDFs for the ground impact
point becomes two dimensional for both events. An example
of a PDF for a ballistic descent in shown in Figure 2 (the
example is taken from [10], where additional examples for
non-uniformly distributed wind direction are also presented).
E. Probability of events
The events that renders the aircraft uncontrollable and
eventually lead to a descent each has a probability attached to
them. For the computations in this work we simply assume
a certain value measured in ’per flight hour’. For instance
the probability of a ballistic descent is set to 1/50 per flight
hour. The probabilities used are rough estimates based on
the works of others (see below) as well as the experience of
the BVLOS FastTrack project team. The event probability
enters the total probability computation in (1) as a scalar, and
consequently the effect of changing the event probability is
a simple scaling.
The probability of a flight terminating malfunction on
an unmanned aircraft has been studied by a number of
groups. A reliability assessment of an Ultra Stick 120 is
made in [12] and [13] using failure mode effect and analysis
(FMEA), with particular attention to the control surfaces
and servos. No specific probabilities are provided, but are
considered to be high. In [14] probabilities related to military
unmanned aircraft are reported, and the probability of a
flight terminating event is in the order of 10−4 – 10−2 per
flight hour, with the probability for smaller aircraft being
somewhat higher that for the larger aircraft. A group of
students showed in [15] using FMEA based on component
failure rates that their Ultra Stick 120 has on average 2.17
catastrophic (flight terminating) failures per 100 flight hours.
The type of failures considered relates to the ballistic descent
and uncontrolled glide in the present work. In [16] they
showed how a dedicated reconstruction of the aircraft based
on a fault tree analysis could theoretically reduce the failure
rate by 20 times, and they were able to implement changes
to the physical aircraft to achieve a catastrophic failure rate
of 0.76 per 100 flight hours. Actuators and control surfaces
are investigated in [17], [18] where the probability of an
uncontrollable aircraft is modelled assuming a servo fault
detection algorithm. In [19] a method for estimating me-
chanical failure rate of small unmanned aircraft is presented,
and an example is provided based on the SPAARO aircraft at
25 kg. The example explicitly lists the used probabilities for
servo and deflection surfaces as well as engine and battery,
and these probabilities are provided by two experiences RC
pilots. Probabilities of failure for a wing bolt and main spar
are theoretically derived. The resulting failure rate for the
aircraft (covering the ballistic and uncontrolled glide events)
is 0.19 failures per flight hour. With suggested improvements
for the engine, wing bolt, servos, and redundant control
surfaces the failure can be reduced to 0.028 failure per flight
hours (equivalent to 36 hours between failures). Note that this
includes non-catastrophic failures, where the aircraft may be
able to return home.
The Heliscope Talon aircraft is specifically used for BV-
LOS flights and reliability is therefore a primary concern.
This means that alterations made to the aircraft as well as
the maintenance and operational procedures are focused on
providing a reasonably reliable aircraft. Combined with the
figures referenced above from literature, the probabilities
listed in Table I seems probable, without being neither
conservative nor optimistic. As the aircraft accumulates flight
hours these probabilities can be updated to more accurately
reflect the true probabilities for that aircraft.
Fig. 1. From left to right people density maps with resolutions of 1 km, 100 m, and 25 m. The color scale is the same and goes from 0 (white) through
1 (dark blue) to 40.000 person/km2 (dark red). Note how the density tends to grow with increased resolution due to the same number of people being
registered in still smaller squares. Semi-transparent topographical information is overlaid; roads are brown, urban areas in dark yellow, forest in green, and
municipality border in black. The town in the center of view is Thorsø.
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Fig. 2. An example of a PDF for a ballistic event with altitude y = 150,
aircraft mass m = 2, front area of 0.1 m2, CD ∼ N(µ = 0.9, σ = 0.2),
speed v ∼ N(15, 1), wind compass heading N(90, 2) (east), wind speed
N(12, 8), and flight direction is compass heading 0 (north). Dark blue is
zero probability and yellow is highest probability. The PDF resolution is 1
m by 1 m.
F. People density
The density of people on the ground is the main factor in
the probability of impacting a person in the event of a crash.
For the BVLOS flights where long distances are typically
covered the variation in people density can be significant
during the flight. Also, the different type of descent varies
somewhat in impact area (that is, a ballistic descent is
typically close to the incident location, whereas a flyaway
may lead to a descent many kilometers from the incident
location). This means that for some events the resolution of
the people density map must be fairly high to give accurate
estimates of the person impact probability, while for other
events the resolution can be more coarse and still give
accurate results.
A list of geographical coordinates of all addresses in
Denmark is publicly available and we have used this to
generate people density maps with varying resolution to fit
the different types of descent. While a fine resolution will
of course work for any type of event the computation time
grows significantly, so maps are generated that suits the
spatial extend of the impact area for each type of event.
In figure 1 are shown three examples of such maps.
While these maps does show where people live they
obviously do not show where people actually are. As this
information is evidently very difficult to obtain we will make
the assumptions that people are, with some probability, in the
vicinity of their home, and are outside exposed to a small
unmanned aircraft potentially descending. Inspired by [20]
an appropriate probability of people being exposed is around
30%. This is also referred to as the shelter factor. We will
also assume that the number of people associated with each
address is equal to the average number of people in a Danish
household. This number is 5.75M people divided by 2.65M
households, equal to 2.17 people per household. The number
of addresses is 3.3M as some addresses are not households,
but rather businesses and industry. The density map used in
this work is no adjusted to account for this.
G. Probability of fatality when impacted
When a drone impacts a human there is a probability
that the impact will inflect injuries that will result in a
fatality. Determining this probability for a given person and
a given drone is not simple, partly because of the many
different ways the impact can occur, and partly because the
easily determined parameters, such a speed and mass, do
not have a simple correlation to injury severity, because the
human body reacts differently depending on the impacted
body part, and the fact that injuries primarily relate to
how fast and where the kinetic energy is dissipated in the
body, not the kinetic energy of the impacting object. For a
review of literature on drone-like human injuries, see [21].
A number of reasonably accurate and empirically verified
models have been developed. One model that fits well to a
drone (chest) impact scenario is [22] which uses a lumped-
mass thoracic model to develop a VC parameter, where V is
thorax compression velocity and C is compression relative
to chest depth. The VC parameter for a given impact maps
well to injury severity.
The blunt criterion (BC) [23] is useful because it does
map kinetic energy to injury severity. It is defined as
BC = ln
E
W 1/3TD
, (4)
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Fig. 3. Mapping from impact speed to probability of fatality for the Talon
aircraft. Specifications for the aircraft and the simulated flight are found in
Table I and II. The ballistic descent impact speed emerges from simulation
and is approximately 25 m/s, and the fly-away impact speed is assumed
equal to the cruise speed.
where E is kinetic energy, W is mass of impacted object, T
is thickness of the body wall (in cm), and D is diameter of
impacting object (in cm). According to [24] T = kW 1/3
with k = 0.6 for females and k = 0.7 for males, and
according to [25] we have AIS = 1.33 · BC + 0.6. And by
interpolating the fatality rates normally associated with the
AIS scale [26] we can now map kinetic energy to fatality rate.
Note that an adaption of BC to impacts of drones is done
in [27], where a generic drone design is used to develop
formulas specifically for thorax and head impacts. It does
not map all the way to fatality rate, though.
Figure 3 shows the map from impact speed to probability
of fatality for the Talon aircraft. Since it for this mission
operates at a fixed altitude and fixed cruise speed the graph
does not change during the flight. The three relevant impact
speeds can therefore easily be shown on the graphs.
III. RESULTS
The methods for quantifying the probability of fatality
described in the previous section lends itself to a wide range
of unmanned aircraft flight operations. It primarily requires
knowledge on the aircraft specifications, a reasonably good
population density map, a flight path, and assumptions on the
probability of the flight terminating events. In the following
the method is demonstrated in a given application where
all the parameters are available. Subsequently, it seems
reasonable to assume that the risk associated with flights
with the same aircraft at other geographical locations has an
equivalent level as long as these locations have parameters
similar to the ones used for the computation done here.
A. Aircraft and flight path
To demonstrate the ability of the proposed method for
estimating probability of fatality for a given flight we employ
Fig. 4. Talon modified model aircraft used by Heliscope.
TABLE I
TALON AIRCRAFT SPECIFICATIONS.
Flight time 1 h 15 min
Mass m 3.75 kg
Cruise speed 18 m/s
Glide speed 12 m/s
Glide ratio N(µ = 12, σ = 2)
Probability of ballistic descent 1/50 per hour
Probability of uncontrolled glide 1/50 per hour
Probability of fly-away 1/100 per hour
Drag coefficient at ballistic descent N(µ = 0.9, σ = 0.2)
Area for drag at ballistic descent 0.1 m2
Area for person impact at ballistic descent 100 cm2
Area for person impact at glide and fly-away 25 cm2
the specifications of the Heliscope aircraft and an actual
BVLOS flight demonstration conducted December 1, 2016.
The aircraft is a modified Talon, shown in Figure 4. It
is equipped with a down-looking camera for imagery of
power lines for post flight inspection as well as a forward
looking camera to aid the pilot during BVLOS flight and
in emergency situations. It is powered by a single electric
motor with push-propeller, and has additional LiPo battery
capacity compared to the standard version. The autopilot is a
PixHawk and the ground control station is a standard laptop
running Mission Planner. The aircraft parameters used in the
risk assessment computation are given in Table I.
The flight path is an approximately 16 km long almost
straight stretch that follows a large power line. This is flown
in both directions, with a 10 meter offset to the center of the
power line, making the total flight about 33 km, including
turn at the end and take-off and landing. A total of 95
waypoints (WP) are set along the power line, with an average
distance of 350 meters in order to follow the bends of the
power line as well as the varying terrain elevation. Except
for take-off and landing the entire flight is flown at 80 m
AGL and at cruise speed. The geographical location of this
flight has been chosen because it is a (by Danish standards)
less populated area, and the take-off location has easy access
by road and features a larger field which the owner would
let the project use. No other property owners along the flight
TABLE II
FLIGHT AND SIMULATION SPECIFICATIONS.
Flight distance 32.9 km
Flight time at cruise speed ∼ 30 min
Flight speed (cruise speed) 18 m/s
Flight altitude 80 m AGL
Number of WPs 95
Wind speed N(µ = 0, σ = 5)
Wind direction unif(0, 2π)
Person area Aperson, ballistic descent 0.3 m2/person
Person area Aperson, glide and fly-away 0.6 m2/person
Shelter factor S 0.3
Sample distance, ballistic descent 50 m
Sample distance, uncontrolled glide 200 m
Sample distance, fly-away Every WP
path were informed of the flight.
The flight path is shown in Figure 5 along with (one
version of) the population density map and some topograph-
ical information. This flight was conducted according to a
special permit given by the Danish Transport, Construction
and House Authority as part of the joint BVLOS FastTrack
project and based on the results presented in this work. An
excerpt from one of the images captured on the December
1 flight is shown in Figure 6.
B. Flight path sampling
The flight path is available as a set of WGS84 coordinates.
For the purpose of computing probability of fatality during
the flight the path is sampled at equidistant points (and
more densely than the WPs) under the assumption that
the flight path is straight lines between WPs. The sample
density is chosen such as to match the geographical extend
of the probable impact area for each of the three events
described in Section II-B as well as the population density
map appropriate for each event. As the size of the probable
impact area for the ballistic event is in the order of 100 m
by 100 m the sampling density for this event is set to 50
m. The population density map used is 25 m by 25 m. A
more dense sampling of the flight path than this only gives
negligibly different results. Similarly the sample density of
the uncontrolled glide is set to 200 m. The sample density for
a fly-away can be as high as several km, but for practicable
purpose in the computation is set to each WP (averaging 350
m sample density). The wind is assumed to be uniformly
distributed in direction and normally distributed in speed
with 0 mean and standard deviation of 5 m/s. While the wind
direction and speed is known for the December 1 flight the
risk assessment will not assume specific prior knowledge of
the wind conditions. The parameters used in the simulation
is listed in Table II.
C. Computing probability of fatality
In the following the ballistic descent (BD) is used to
describe the fatality probability computation, but the same
procedure is used for uncontrolled glide and fly-away (and
with the parameters pertaining to those two events).
For each sample point on the flight path the parameters
for that point is used to determined the ground impact
PDF relative to that point (see an example in Figure 2).
Offsetting the PDF relative to the coordinates of the assumed
event point gives the probability of the aircraft impacting
the ground in absolute coordinates. The PDF matrix is
then entry-wise multiplied with the population density map
(appropriately sampled matrix D) for the same area and the
result is a map of the probability of impacting a person with
the size of one pixel in the PDF map, that is a 1 m2 large
person. A summation over this map gives the probability of
impacting a 1 m2 person given a ballistic descent. We assume
that a person takes up a particular area that depends on the
expected impact angle, and this value is multiplied onto the
result. Additionally, it is multiplied with the shelter factor
S. This will then provide the probability pimpact person of
impacting a person (see (1) above) given a particular event
at the given event point. The computation can be formulated
as
pimpact person = S ·Aperson ·
∑
latitude
longitude
PDF ◦D , (5)
where ◦ is the Hadamard product and · is the scalar product.
For each sample point the probability of fatal injury
pfatal impact can also be computed. This is done using the
simulation and descent parameters as described in Section II-
G, and this probability is used in (1) along with the event
probability pevent to give the probability of fatality pfatality.
This probability is valid for the period of time where the
aircraft is in the vicinity of the flight path sample point; for
computational purposes we will assume that this probability
is valid from the given event point until the next is reached.
With the sample distances given in Table II the time between
event points is about 3 seconds for ballistic descent, 11
seconds for uncontrolled glide, and 19 seconds for fly-
away. The time-varying probabilities of fatality are shown
in Figure 7. There are distinct differences between the three
graphs. The ballistic descent is targeting a relatively small
impact area with a comparatively high probability. At the
same time the resolution of the population density map is
small, and because the flight is over a thinly populated area
many of the (small) cells in this map have zero density.
Consequently, for many of the sampled event points along
the flight path the crash area for the ballistic descent only
covers zero density cells. And therefore this graphs is zero
for most of the flight. And whenever the aircraft passes over
a farm or cluster of houses, the probability increases briefly.
The uncontrolled glide impact area is somewhat larger
(roughly two order of magnitudes) than that of the ballistic
descent, and the population density map used is compar-
atively more coarse. As a consequences the probability of
fatality graph is much more smooth. Once large peak is seen
just prior to the aircraft reaching the point where it turns
around and flies back along the same path. This is because
the flight path ends just south of the city of Bjerringbro, and
even though the aircraft turns around before overflying the
Fig. 5. Flight path for December 2016 test flight. The flight starts south of Granslev and goes up to south of Bjerringbro, where the aircraft makes a
U-turn and flies back along the same set of WPs to the take-off location. Each red circle represents a waypoint. The background population density map
is with 100 m resolution and is described in Section II-F. The topographical information is the same as in Figure 1. The red stars are wind turbines.
Fig. 6. Excerpt from a an image captured by the Talon aircraft onboard
downlooking camera during the December 1 test flight.
city, in the event of an uncontrolled glide the aircraft would
still be able to glide into the very southern part of the city.
This can be seen on Figure 5. As soon as the aircraft has
turned to fly back the probability drops.
The fly-away impact area is quite large, covering many
square kilometers. Therefore it changes relatively little dur-
ing the flight. The slow increase is an effect of the maximum
flight range decreasing during the flight and the city of
Aarhus (population ∼270.000) being within range of a fly-
away for the entire flight. Therefore, this city constitutes
an increasing part of the potential impact area as the flight
progresses.
D. Joint probability of fatality
For each of the events the average probability of fatality
is computed and summed to give the total probability for
the entire flight. This is shown in Table III. Also, a series of
intermediate results are available for this methods, including
probability of impact a person (graphs similar to those in
Figure 7, but obviously with higher probabilities) and number
of people subjected to a potential drone crash. For these
results only the totals are given, see Table III. It is important
to note that the probabilities given in Table III are rather
approximative for two reasons; 1) they are based on a series
of assumptions that display varying degree of accuracy and
obviously the end result is no more accurate than these
assumptions (see Section III-E), and 2) the probabilities
should have been conditional in the sense that the probability
of an event at any give time is conditional on that any event
has not yet occurred. For instance, a fly-away at a given
time is conditional on the aircraft not experiencing a ballistic
descent prior to this time. However, as all the probabilities
are indeed relative small the error is negligible compared to
the inaccuracy caused by previously mentioned assumptions.
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10-7 Probability of fatality per flight hour for uncontrolled glide
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10-7 Probability of fatality per flight hour for fly away
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Fig. 7. The probability of fatality for the three event types as a function of time during the flight. The dashed red line shown the average for the entire
flight. At the bottom of the third graph is shown the time location of the 95 waypoints.
TABLE III
PROBABILITIES OF PERSON IMPACT AND OF RESULTING FATALITIES.
Ballistic Uncontrolled glide Fly away Total
Person impact probability per flight hour 2.2 · 10−8 1.3 · 10−7 3.0 · 10−7 4.6 · 10−7
Average probability of fatality on impact 0.42 0.061 0.43 n/a
Fatality probability per flight hour 9.2 · 10−9 7.9 · 10−9 1.3 · 10−7 1.5 · 10−7
E. Interpretation and validity of results
The list of assumptions enabling the computation of the
probabilities shown in Figure 7 and in Table III is fairly
long and holds values that are estimates based on work
done by others on other drones, some estimates are based on
general knowledge about small unmanned aircraft, and some
of the parameters are pure guesswork and remains unproven.
It would be valuable to determine how these uncertainties
affect the uncertainty of the results, but since some of the
computations are rather nonlinear the effect of varying the
parameters is not easy to determine. A study of the sensitivity
of the individual parameters remains as future work.
The substantial uncertainty aside the estimated parameters
in Table I and II have deliberately been chosen slightly
conservative to reduce the risk that the derived probabilities
are unrealistically low. Consequently, as it is indeed likely
that estimate of 10−7 fatalities per flight hour is an order of
magnitude wrong (in the sense that if this particular aircraft
were to fly the specified mission repeatedly for 107 hour,
with suitable maintenance etc. we would on average see one
fatality) it is still within the uncertainty range that applies to
similar considerations for manned aviation.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The method applied to the power line inspection flight
demonstrates how it is possible to quantify an estimate of
the probability of fatality for a specific flight. The computa-
tions are easy to repeat for another flight path, and indeed
for another aircraft. It is important to note that the risk
assessment here does not cover all possible flight terminating
events, as does it not include midair collision. However, it is
relatively easy to include additional events (which is certainly
necessary for other aircraft types, such as rotorcraft), and the
flight is conducted in such a fashion that midair collisions are
highly unlikely. For approval of BVLOS flights this method
contributes in a tangible way to assist the authorities in
determining the risk associated with a given type of flight
operations, and as indicated above the Danish Transport,
Construction, and Housing Authority accepts this method as
a valid tool to anyone applying for permit to conduct BVLOS
operations in Danish airspace.
There remains lots of future work to improve and refine
the method, as well as including more events, and more
types of aircraft. Also, more accuracy on assumptions will
be beneficial for the resulting probabilities.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work is supported by the BVLOS FastTrack project
between the Danish Tranport, Construction and Housing Au-
thority, University of Southern Denmark, Aalborg University,
UAS Test Center Denmark, and Heliscope. We wish to thank
the partners for providing information and data for this work.
REFERENCES
[1] R. A. Clothier, B. P. Williams, and N. L. Fulton, “Structuring the
safety case for unmanned aircraft system operations in non-segregated
airspace,” Safety Science, vol. 79, pp. 213–228, 2015. [Online].
Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2015.06.007
[2] R. A. Clothier and R. A. Walker, “The Safety Risk Management
of Unmanned Aircraft Systems,” in Handbook of Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles, K. P. Valavanis and G. J. Vachtsevanos, Eds. Springer
Science + Business Media B.V., Dordrecht, Netherlands, 2013, p. 37.
[3] X. Lin, N. L. Fulton, and M. E. T. Horn, “Quantification of high level
safety criteria for civil unmanned aircraft systems,” in IEEE Aerospace
Conference Proceedings, no. September, 2014, p. 13.
[4] E. Denney, G. Pai, and I. Habli, “Perspectives on software safety case
development for unmanned aircraft,” Proceedings of the International
Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks, 2012.
[5] E. Denney and G. Pai, “Architecting a Safety Case for UAS Flight
Operations,” in 34th International System Safety Conference, 2016.
[6] D. W. King, A. Bertapelle, and C. Moses, “UAV Failure Rate Criteria
for Equivalent Level of Safety,” in International Helicopter Safety
Symposium, Montreal, 2005, p. 9.
[7] P. Wu and R. Clothier, “The Development of Ground Impact Models
for the Analysis of the Risks Associated with Unmanned Aircraft
Operations Over Inhabited Areas,” in Proceedings of the 11th Prob-
abilistic Safety Assessment and Management Conference (PSAM11)
and the An- nual European Safety and Reliability Conference (ESREL
2012), 2012, p. 14.
[8] R. Clothier, R. Walker, N. Fulton, and D. Campbell, “A casualty risk
analysis for unmanned aerial system (UAS) operations over inhabited
areas,” in Second Australasian Unmanned Air Vehicle Conference,
2007, pp. 1–15.
[9] R. Clothier, B. Williams, and A. Washington, “Development of
a Template Safety Case for Unmanned Aircraft Operations Over
Populous Areas,” in SAE 2015 AeroTech Congress & Exhibition, sep
2015, p. 10. [Online]. Available: http://papers.sae.org/2015-01-2469/
[10] A. la Cour-Harbo and H. Schioler, “Ground impact probability
distribution for small unmanned aircraft in ballistic descent,” 2017,
preprint. [Online]. Available: http://vbn.aau.dk/da/publications/ground-
impact-probability-distribution-for-small-unmanned-aircraft-in-
ballistic-descent(dc2d6dc0-30f4-44cd-a989-98962b925a76).html
[11] A. la Cour-Harbo, “Quantifying ground impact fatality
rate for small unmanned aircraft,” 2017, preprint. [Online].
Available: http://vbn.aau.dk/da/publications/quantifying-ground-
impact-fatality-rate-for-small-unmanned-aircraft(bc811620-07b3-
49c7-a86f-41f9a8dd409e).html
[12] P. Freeman and G. J. Balas, “Actuation failure modes and effects
analysis for a small UAV,” in 2014 American Control Conference.
IEEE, jun 2014, pp. 1292–1297.
[13] P. M. Freeman, “Reliability Assessment for Low-cost Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minneota, 2014.
[14] Office of the Secretary of Defence, “Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle Reliability Study,” Department of
Defense, Tech. Rep. February, 2003. [Online]. Available:
http://www.acq.osd.mil/uas/docs/reliabilitystudy.pdf%5Cnfile://d/Technical/uavs/UAV
market analysis/UAV reliabilitystudy.pdf
[15] S. Reimann, J. Amos, E. Bergquist, J. Cole, J. Phillips, and S. Shuster,
“UAV for Reliability,” AEM 4331 Aerospace Vehicle Design, Tech.
Rep. December, 2013.
[16] ——, “UAV for Reliability Build,” University of Minnesota, Tech.
Rep., 2014.
[17] R. Venkataraman, “Reliability Assessment of Actuator Architectures
for Unmanned Aircraft,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota,
2015.
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